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Abstract

The departure of Commissioner Mario Monti from his post as the EC Commissioner for competition policy provides a good opportunity to reflect upon the
achievements and perceived failures of the European Commission in the field of
antitrust law over the past five years. This paper attempts to do so on the basis
of six core principles of sound competition policy. Under the first principle, it
is undisputable that the Commission under Commissioner Monti’s leadership has
been at the forefront of the international efforts undertaken in the fight against cartels. Second, despite some weaknesses in areas such as conglomerate mergers or
in its approach to the Microsoft case, the Commission’s focus now appears to be in
the protection of competition, not competitors. Third, after a string of annulments
of Commission merger decisions by the EC judiciary, the Commission has made
substantial progress toward assuring that its decisions are based on sound economics and hard evidence (including consideration of efficiencies). Fourth, recent
Commission policy confirms that the Commission is ready to limit intervention to
those cases that really cause harm to the competition process. Fifth, despite some
concerns arising from the reform of the merger review process, the Commission
is working hard to ensure that competition laws do not become bureaucratic roadblocks to efficient transactions. Sixth, Commissioner Monti has been instrumental
in promoting international initiatives designed to promote a better understanding
of competition policy.
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Mario Monti’s Legacy:
A U.S. Perspective
William J. Kolasky

T

he departure of Commissioner Mario Monti from his post as the EC

Commissioner for competition policy provides a good opportunity to
reflect upon the achievements and perceived failures of the European
Commission in the field of antitrust law over the past five years. This paper
attempts to do so on the basis of six core principles of sound competition policy. Under the first principle, it is undisputable that the Commission under
Commissioner Monti’s leadership has been at the forefront of the international efforts undertaken in the fight against cartels. Second, despite some weaknesses in areas such as conglomerate mergers or in its approach to the Microsoft
case, the Commission’s focus now appears to be in the protection of competition, not competitors. Third, after a string of annulments of Commission merger decisions by the EC judiciary, the Commission has made substantial progress
toward assuring that its decisions are based on sound economics and hard evidence (including consideration of efficiencies). Fourth, recent Commission
policy confirms that the Commission is ready to limit intervention to those
cases that really cause harm to the competition process. Fifth, despite some
concerns arising from the reform of the merger review process, the Commission
is working hard to ensure that competition laws do not become bureaucratic
roadblocks to efficient transactions. Sixth, Commissioner Monti has been
instrumental in promoting international initiatives designed to promote a better understanding of competition policy.
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I. Introduction
In November 2004, after five years as EC Competition Commissioner, Mario
Monti left his post. It is, therefore, a good time to reflect on the achievements of
Commissioner Monti and analyze the extent to which he, and by extension, the
European Commission, has contributed to the shaping of EC competition law in
an increasingly global economy.
This paper argues that, over the past five years, the Commission has come a
long way in reforming both its procedures and its substantive standards to bring
them more in line with modern economic thinking as to sound competition policy. While Commissioner Monti deserves credit for many of these reforms, some
were initiated under his predecessor Karel Van Miert—principally, the reform
process that led to the decentralization in the application of Articles 81 and 82
of the EC Treaty (Article 81 and Article 82). In other areas the reforms were, to
some extent, forced on the Commission by the European Court of First Instance
(CFI) as a result of three decisions reversing merger prohibitions.1 Whatever the
genesis of these ideas, however, Commissioner Monti has been responsible for
their implementation, which in most cases has been exemplary. More importantly, Commissioner Monti has overseen the Commission’s first efforts at putting
the theories and rhetoric of the reforms into practice. While it is too early to
make any definitive pronouncements on the Commission’s new practices, the
approach taken by the Commission in recent merger decisions such as
Sony/BMG2 and Oracle/PeopleSoft3 provides reason for the competition community to be optimistic. Commissioner Monti also deserves enormous credit for
guiding his Directorate-General (DG COMP) through a difficult period and
engineering a positive response to the Commission’s losses at the CFI. The string
of reversals and annulments could have thrown his institution into crisis but for
his strong leadership. Commissioner Monti was, on the contrary, able to use the
ongoing reform process to reflect on the perceived failures of DG COMP and
propose measures to tackle such weaknesses.
Central to Commissioner Monti’s success in the implementation of the
reforms—from the U.S. perspective at least—has been that he has fully embraced
a consumer welfare standard for competition enforcement. In an October 2002
speech in the Netherlands, I defined competition as “the process by which market forces operate freely to assure that society’s scarce resources are employed as

1

See Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II-2585 [hereinafter Airtours]; Case T-310/01,
Schneider Electric v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II-4071 [hereinafter Schneider]; and Case T-5/02, Tetra
Laval v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II-4382 [hereinafter Tetra Laval], appeal to the ECJ is pending.

2

Commission Decision COMP/M.3333, Sony/BMG (Jul. 19, 2004, not yet reported) [hereinafter
Sony/BMG].

3

Commission Decision COMP/M.3216, Oracle/PeopleSoft (Oct. 26, 2004, not yet reported) [hereinafter
Oracle/Peoplesoft].
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efficiently as possible to maximize total economic welfare.”4 The fact that
Commissioner Monti’s reforms were based on this key objective has provided a
fundamental vision for EC competition law that is not far from U.S. views on the
aims of antitrust policy, and this, hopefully, will guide the Commission’s future
decision-making at both the macro-policy level and the micro-case level.
In earlier papers and speeches, I have also articulated a number of core principles of sound competition policy that should assist antitrust authorities in getting
their priorities right. At the time of Commissioner Monti’s departure, it may be
useful to analyze EC competition policy over the last five years in light of these
principles. I have proposed the following core principles:
(i) Impose strong deterrent measures against hard-core cartels;
(ii) Protect competition, not competitors;
(iii) Base decisions on sound economics and hard evidence—this should,
among other things, lead to recognizing the central role of efficiencies
in antitrust analysis;
(iv) Realize that our predictive capabilities are limited—this requires
antitrust authorities to be as flexible and dynamic as the industries
with which they deal; and
(v) Impose no unnecessary bureaucratic roadblocks.
Finally, as an additional guiding principle, I believe it is the role of every experienced antitrust enforcer to
(vi) Promote a better understanding of sound competition policy, principally by means of an active involvement in international initiatives.

II. First, Impose Strong Deterrent Measures
Against Hard-Core Cartels
Detection and prosecution of hard-core cartels (those involving price-fixing,
output limitation, bid rigging, or market sharing) should be every competition
authority’s top enforcement priority. As recently pointed out by the U.S.
Supreme Court, collusion is “the supreme evil of antitrust.”5 Cartels raise prices
and restrict supply, enriching producers at the expense of consumers and affecting the welfare of the entire economy.
4

William J. Kolasky, What is Competition?, Seminar on Convergence sponsored by the Netherlands
Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Hague (Oct. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200440.htm, reprinted as Kolasky, What is Competition? A
Comparison of U.S. and European Perspectives, THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 29 (Spring-Summer 2004).

5

Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
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From this perspective, Commissioner Monti’s contribution to the effective
enforcement of a sound competition policy can only be praised. Early during his
five-year tenure, Commissioner Monti made it clear that action against cartels
would be one of his top priorities.6 In fact, he has described cartels as “cancers on
the open market economy, which forms the very basis of our Community.”7
During his mandate, Commissioner Monti has successfully ensured effective
enforcement against hard-core cartels, substantially increasing the resources allocated within the Commission to cartel detection and prosecution. Moreover,
Commissioner Monti has recognized that—as we know well in the United
States—public enforcement would benefit from complementary action brought
by private parties that have suffered the consequences of cartel behavior; he has,
therefore, been a strong advocate for increased private action within EU
Member States.8 There is little doubt that over the past five years, the United
States has found in the European Community a strong ally in a fight that has
become increasingly global as barriers to trade continue to be dismantled.

A. UNPRECEDENTED NUMBER OF CASES PROSECUTED
The most straightforward tool for measuring the success (or failure) of a competition authority in prosecuting cartels is an assessment of the number of cases
successfully prosecuted. During the five years of Commissioner Monti’s tenure,
we have witnessed an unprecedented number of hard-core cartel cases being successfully brought to an end in Europe. During the 2001-2003 period, the
Commission issued on average eight cartel decisions per year (with ten negative
decisions affecting more than 65 companies in 2001 alone). This is an enormous
increase in cartel enforcement by the Commission when compared to the average for the previous 30 years of EC cartel practice: 1.5 decisions per year.9
Conscious of the increased globalization of cartels, Commissioner Monti also
set as one of his top priorities the development of cooperation mechanisms to
ensure successful prosecution of cartels on a worldwide scale. Cooperation
between antitrust agencies in the European Community and the United States
6

“Fighting cartels is one of the most important areas of activity of any competition authority and a
clear priority of the Commission...” (Mario Monti, Fighting Cartels—Why and How? Why Should We
Be Concerned with Cartels and Collusive Behaviour, 3rd Nordic Competition Policy Conference,
Stockholm (Sep. 11-12, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/00/295&format=HTML.)

7

Id.

8

Mario Monti, Private Litigation as a Key Complement to Public Enforcement of Competition Rules and
the First Conclusions on the Implementation of the Merger Regulation, IBA 8th Annual Competition
Conference, Fiesole (Sep. 17, 2004), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=SPEECH/04/403&format=HTML.

9

European Commission, XXXIIIth Report on Competition Policy (2003), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/annual_reports/2003/final_en.pdf.
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has now become regular practice. The very prominent Vitamins case is a good
example of the extensive cooperation between both antitrust authorities, such
cooperation leading to the successful prosecution of one of the most damaging
cartels ever uncovered.

B. UNPRECEDENTED HIGH LEVEL OF FINES
The increased number of cartels that have been successfully investigated and
brought to an end has been coupled with an unprecedented level in the amount
of fines imposed on the infringers. Under Commissioner Monti’s tenure, the
Commission has made wide use of the broad discretion that the EC legislation
affords to it when determining the level of fines to be imposed on cartel perpetrators. In particular, and in what may be seen as a compensation for the lack of
criminal sanctions at EC level, the Commission is not bound by a strict set of
requirements such as those imposed by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines when
determining the amount of fines in cartel cases.10 Such unprecedented high fines
fulfill the objective of continued deterrence by increasing the level of fines that
companies may face for infringement of the competition rules.
Since Commissioner Monti took office in October 1999, the total amount of
fines imposed by the Competition Directorate in cartel cases is above EUR 4.5
billion (an unprecedented amount compared to earlier EC standards; in fact, as
U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust R. Hewitt Pate recently pointed
out, EC fines exceeded those levied against cartelists in the United States during
the same period11).
As the clearest example of this increased emphasis on deterrence, the Vitamins
cartel led in 2001 to overall fines exceeding EUR 850 million. In the Vitamins
case, Hoffmann-la-Roche, the world’s largest maker of vitamins, was fined EUR
462 million—until the recent Microsoft Article 82 decision,12 the highest fine
ever imposed by the Commission on an individual company—and BASF, the
world’s second-largest maker of vitamins, almost EUR 300 million. Other cases
prosecuted during Commissioner Monti’s mandate have led to overall fines of

10 Note that the Commission has issued Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to
Article 15(2) of Regulation No. 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, 1998 O.J. (C 9) 3. However, the
Guidelines expressly indicate, as part of their policy statement, that they do not detract from the discretion that the Commission is granted when setting fines, within the overall limit of 10 percent of
overall turnover. For an overview of the Commission’s application of its Guidelines, see François
Arbault, La politique de la Commission en matière d’amendes antitrust: récents développements,
perspectives d’avenir, COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER NO. 2 (2003).
11 R. Hewitt Pate, Antitrust in a Transatlantic Context—from the Cicada’s Perspective, Antitrust in a
Transatlantic Context Conference, Brussels (Jun. 7, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/203973.htm.
12 Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft (Mar. 24, 2004, not yet reported) [hereinafter
Microsoft].
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EUR 478 million (Plasterboard cartel, 2002), EUR 313 million (Carbonless
Paper cartel, 2001), EUR 222 million (Copper Plumbing Tubes cartel, 2004),
and EUR 218 million (Graphite Electrodes cartel, 2001).13

C. LEGISLATIVE REFORMS FACILITATING THE PROSECUTION OF
CARTELS
During his tenure, Commissioner Monti has brought to successful completion
the far-reaching reform of the rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 that was
launched by his predecessor Karel Van Miert. One of the key objectives of the
Modernization Regulation14 has been “to allow the Commission to become more
active in the pursuit of serious competition infringements” and to “strengthen
competition policy with regard to cartels.”15 To that effect, the Commission has
been granted new inspection powers, such as (i) the power to seal any business
premises and books or records for the period of and to the extent necessary for
the inspection; (ii) the power to ask for oral explanations of facts or documents
pertaining to the subject matter and purpose of the inspection; and (iii) (more
contentiously) the power to enter non-business premises when a reasonable suspicion exists that books or other records relevant to the inspection are being kept
in those non-business premises.16 These new powers of investigation are coupled
with increased fines for breach of the obligation to cooperate during the
Commission’s inspections.
In addition, and most importantly, the Modernization Regulation is premised
upon the creation of a network of competition authorities, called the European
Competition Network (ECN), which should provide a basis for increased horizontal cooperation by the Commission and national competition authorities in
cartel prosecution—namely, by an increased flow of information between the
agencies.
Last, it is worth noting that, throughout the consultation process that led to
the Commission’s reform of its enforcement powers, the European Commission
did not shy away from a discussion as to whether cartels should be criminalized
in the European Community. In the United States, we have long considered
hard-core cartels to be crimes, and have prosecuted the perpetrators as crimi-

13 Note that in a recent judgment, the CFI reduced the total amount of the fines imposed on seven of
the eight cartel participants, from approximately EUR 207 million to approximately EUR 153 million.
See, e.g., Case T-236/01, Tokai Carbon v. Commission (Apr. 29, 2004, not yet reported).
14 Council Regulation 1/2003/EC on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1 [hereinafter Modernization Regulation].
15 Commission White Paper on Modernization of the Rules Implementing Articles [85] and [86] of the EC
Treaty, 1999 O.J. (C 132) 1.
16 See Modernization Regulation, supra note 14, at art. 20.
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nals. In the end, the Commission decided not to follow the approach of other
national competition law authorities (e.g. the United Kingdom and Ireland)
that have recently opted for the criminalization of hard-core cartels.17
Notwithstanding, it is safe to say that the new investigative powers granted to
the Commission, coupled with the strong commitment by the European
Community to promote cartel detection and prosecution, will ensure that cartel perpetrators continue to have a tough time if engaging in illegal activity in
the European Community.

D. REVISION OF THE COMMISSION’S LENIENCY PROGRAM
The revision of the Commission’s Leniency Notice18 has been another of the
major drivers in the Commission’s unprecedented effort against cartels. The new
Leniency Notice also provides a good example of the synergies brought about by
the cooperation and mutual understanding between authorities in the United
States and the European Community; the experience gathered by the United
States through its own amnesty program positively influenced the EC revision.
In addition, the Commission has taken into account the challenges an EC
amnesty applicant will face in parallel U.S. civil litigation in devising creative
alternatives to written corporate statements, in particular, the acceptance of oral
amnesty applications.
Among the revised features of the new program, the Leniency Notice softens
the conditions that must be met by an applicant seeking to qualify for amnesty
as it removes the requirement that the applicant provide “decisive” evidence and
extends amnesty to applicants that acted as “instigators”—provided that the
company did not take steps to coerce other entities into participating in the
infringement—or played a determining role in a cartel.19
The Leniency Notice also provides increased certainty that amnesty will be
afforded to the first firm that, by providing important insider information to the
Commission at the critical stages of a cartel investigation, allows the
Commission to either: (i) launch an inspection at the premises of the suspected companies; or (ii) establish an infringement, when the Commission is
already in possession of sufficient information to launch an inspection, but not
to establish such infringement. In order to increase legal certainty, the

17 Article 23(5) of the Modernization Regulation stresses that the fines imposed thereunder “shall not be
of a criminal law nature.” (Modernization Regulation, supra note 14, at art. 23(5).)
18 Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, 2002 O.J. (C 45) 3.
19 During the six years of operation of the 1996 Leniency Notice, the difficulty—and legal uncertainty—
regarding the applicability of the criteria for immunity led to only three companies being granted full
immunity from prosecution: Rhône-Poulenc (Aventis) with regard to two of the three infringements in
which it was involved in the Vitamins investigation; Brasserie de Luxembourg in the Luxembourg
Breweries case; and Sappi in the Carbonless Paper case.
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Commission will now provide an amnesty applicant a letter confirming its position, provided that the applicant complies with the obligations of cooperation
set out in the Leniency Notice. The Commission is also prepared to inform
leniency applicants at an early stage of the procedure about the expected level
of reduction which they can expect in their fine.
The revamped Leniency Notice has already contributed—and, undoubtedly,
will continue to contribute—to the increased detection of hard-core cartels by
the Commission. Already in the first year of operation of the new Leniency
Notice, more than 20 applications for immunity were received by the
Commission—a stark contrast to the total of 16 applications for immunity that
were received during the six years of operation of the 1996 Leniency Notice.20

III. Second, Protect Competition, Not
Competitors
The guiding principle of antitrust law should be the protection of competition
and not the protection of competitors. The competitive process works in part
because it rewards successful firms and eliminates inefficient rivals. Therefore, an
antitrust authority should never seek to protect competitors from stronger rivals.
It should encourage vigorous competition, even by dominant firms and even at
the risk of driving weaker competitors from the market. In general, a firm’s conduct should only be challenged as exclusionary where it is likely to exclude rivals
from the market, serves no legitimate business purpose, and tends to destroy
competition itself.

A. POSITIVE STATEMENTS AND THEORIES
Commissioner Monti, in one of the last speeches of his mandate, stated that the
main goal of EC competition policy is consumer welfare and that “only a very
poorly informed observer can still resort to the catchphrase that the main goal of
competition policy in Europe is a different one, such as protecting competitors.”21
Such statements show an undoubted desire to move EC competition policy further away from the protection of competitors and are to be welcomed. There has
also been salutary recognition by senior Commission officials of the need to clarify the Commission’s policy on the application of Article 82, and of the importance of stimulating a debate within the antitrust community about this area of

20 Bertus Van Barlingen, The European Commission’s 2002 Leniency Notice after one year of operation,
COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER 2 (2003).
21 Mario Monti, A Reformed Competition Policy: Achievements and Challenges for the Future, Center for
European Reform, Brussels (Oct. 28, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=SPEECH/04/477&format=HTML.

162

Hosted byCompetition
The Berkeley
Press
International
PolicyElectronic

Mario Monti’s Legacy: A U.S. Perspective

law.22 An internal review is underway in the Commission, and draft guidelines
may be forthcoming in 2005-2006.

B. INCONSISTENT APPLICATION
It is, however, difficult to ignore some of the more problematic cases and theories of the last five years. The following are prominent examples of where the
Commission still seems to have some progress to make, but it must be emphasized that the overall signs confirm that the Commission is making significant
strides in this regard.

1. Conglomerate Mergers
First, the Commission’s approach to conglomerate mergers remains of concern.
General Electric/Honeywell would have been the largest industrial merger in the
world.23 After a careful five-month investigation, the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) decided not to challenge the merger, save where it led to horizontal overlaps.24 In contrast, in a well-publicized, and sometimes criticized,25 decision, the
Commission decided that the merger would strengthen GE’s already dominant
position in the market for large jet engines and would enable the merged entity
to acquire dominance in the small engines, avionics, and non-avionics markets.
In coming to this decision, the Commission chose to forego immediate price
reductions to consumers in the fear that the merged entity would ultimately be
able to drive out competitors. It based its reasoning on a theory of portfolio effects,
fearing the “opportunities and incentives [for bundling], given the unprecedented
range of products and services that will be put at the disposal of the merged entity,”26 and it appeared to be concerned that the merged entity would be able to
enjoy economies of scale and scope which would foreclose competitors.
22 Philip Lowe, Speech delivered at the Fordham Antitrust Conference, Fordham Annual Conference on
International Antitrust & Policy, New York (Oct. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_040_en.pdf.
23 Commission Decision 2004/134/EC, General Electric/Honeywell, 2004 O.J. (L 48) 1 [hereinafter
GE/Honeywell]. For a more detailed critique of the Commission’s decision, see William J. Kolasky,
Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It’s a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels, George Mason
University Symposium Washington D.C. (Nov. 9, 2001).
24 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NOTE FOR DISCUSSION AT OECD ROUNDTABLE ON PORTFOLIO EFFECTS IN CONGLOMERATE
MERGERS (Oct. 15, 2001), at paras. 53 to 60.
25 For criticism from the business community and leading economists, see Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene:
In Europe, GE and Honeywell ran afoul of 19th century thinking, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2001; from legal
scholars, see George L. Priest, The GE/Honeywell Precedent and Franco Romani, WALL ST. J., Jun. 20,
2001, at A1; and for more colorful criticism from editorial writers, see Editorial, Europe to GE: Go
Home, WALL ST. J., Jun. 15, 2001, at A14 and Editorial, Obstructionist Europe, WASH. POST, Jun. 22,
2001, at A24.
26 GE/Honeywell, supra note 23, at para. 361.
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In another example of its theory on conglomerate mergers, the Commission
prohibited the proposed merger between Tetra Laval and Sidel on the ground
that Tetra Laval would leverage its market power in the carton packaging market into the market for polyethylene terephthalate (PET) packaging in which
Sidel was active.27 This decision was annulled by the CFI. The CFI did confirm
that the Commission could, in the presence of “convincing evidence,” prohibit
a merger because of its conglomerate effects; however, such convincing evidence
had not been adduced in the case under consideration.28
The Commission has appealed this judgment to the
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY’S
European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the GE/Honeywell
C O N C E R N W I T H T H E O R I E S T H AT
decision has been appealed to the CFI, so the EC courts
H AV E B E E N L O N G A B A N D O N E D
will have further opportunities to rule on conglomerate
I N T H E U N I T E D S TAT E S I S
mergers.
P R O B A B LY M I S P L A C E D .

G R E AT E R

U.S. law has long considered that antitrust agencies
FAITH SHOULD BE PLACED
should very rarely interfere with conglomerate mergers.
IN THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS
On the contrary, it is recognized that such mergers have
the potential to generate significant efficiencies: the
R AT H E R T H A N W O R RY I N G
injection of capital; the improvement of management
ABOUT COMPETITORS WHO
efficiency; the transfer of know-how and best practices
M AY B E L E S S E F F I C I E N T
across traditional industry boundaries; and the increased
T H A N T H E M E R G E D E N T I T Y.
ability to get by during economic downturns through
diversification. In addition, conglomerate mergers provide a market for owner-managers to sell the businesses that they create, thereby encouraging enterprise and risk-taking. The European Community’s concern
with theories that have been long abandoned in the United States is probably
misplaced. Greater faith should be placed in the competitive process rather than
worrying about competitors who may be less efficient than the merged entity.

2. Microsoft
In 2004, the Commission fined Microsoft EUR 497.2 million for refusing to
make interoperability information for work group servers available on a non-discriminatory basis and for bundling its media player with Windows.29 The behavioral remedies imposed on Microsoft have been defined by some as “interventionist” and as “chilling competition and innovation.”30 In relation to the
requirement to make available an unbundled version of Media Player, it is worth
27 Commission Decision 2004/124/EC, Tetra Laval/Sidel, 2004 O.J. (L 43) 13 [hereinafter Tetra
Laval/Sidel].
28 Tetra Laval, supra note 1.
29 Microsoft, supra note 12.
30 See Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust R. Hewitt Pate’s Statement on the EC’s Microsoft Decision
(Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2004/202976.htm.
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noting that the U.S. courts rejected a similar remedy. Similarly, when considering the refusal to supply full interoperability information, the Commission may
have been too influenced by competitors, who were already competing effectively on the server market. The remedy of obligatory licensing, while not unknown
to U.S. law, is one that must be treated carefully, as a dominant company must
be encouraged to invest in research and create intellectual property. Allowing
competitors to access valuable intellectual property rights may not, in the long
term, be protective of dynamic competition.

3. Rebates Offered by Dominant Firms
Finally, the Commission and the EC courts have long regarded rebates offered by
a dominant firm with some skepticism.31 Just prior to the beginning of
Commissioner Monti’s term of office, the Commission condemned a ticketing
scheme offered by British Airways (BA) to travel agents.32 Then in a case decided during Commissioner Monti’s mandate, Michelin II, the Commission found
that the tire manufacturer’s rebate scheme violated Article 82 as it was loyalty
inducing.33 Both these decisions were upheld by the CFI on the ground, amongst
others, that the schemes led to foreclosure.34 In British Airways/Virgin
(BA/Virgin), the CFI drew attention to the inability of BA’s competitors to match
the level of discounts being offered by BA.35 It also dismissed BA’s argument
based on the rebate’s lack of effect on the market (see below) and the fact that
its competitors’ market shares were increasing.36
This concern with foreclosure of competitors is alien to U.S. law, which considers that single-product price-cutting is lawful provided price remains above
the firm’s avoidable costs. EC law on rebates, as we discuss in greater detail
below, has long been criticized, and it will undoubtedly attract a lot of interest
when the Commission publishes guidelines on the application of Article 82.
The future guidelines and positive statements about EC competition policy
not seeking to protect competitors cannot obscure that real reform is, in the end,
dependent on the way in which antitrust cases are investigated and decided.
Over-reliance on the statements of competitors in the course of an investigation
31 See Case 85/76, Hoffmann La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461.
32 Commission Decision 2000/74/EC, Virgin/British Airways, 2000 O.J. (L 30) 1.
33 Commission Decision 2002/405/EC, Michelin, 2002 O.J. (L 143) 1.
34 Case T-219/99, British Airways plc v. Commission (Dec. 17, 2003, not yet reported) [hereinafter
BA/Virgin]; Case T-203/01, Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission (Sep. 30,
2003, not yet reported) [hereinafter Michelin II].
35 BA/Virgin, supra note 34, at paras. 276-278.
36 Id. at para. 298.
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will naturally result in greater emphasis being placed on these competitors’ concerns. This must be avoided and, as we will move on to discuss, there is no substitute for a detailed examination of facts and sound economic theory in an
antitrust case.

IV. Third, Base Decisions on Sound Economics
and Hard Evidence
Competition agencies have long been confronted by companies, aided by lobbyists and public relations companies, seeking help in using antitrust as a weapon
against their competitors. When faced with such competitor complaints, the best
way to avoid the agency’s decisions becoming politicized is, in Joseph
Schumpeter’s words, to test the complaint against “the cold metal of economic
theory.”37 Commissioner Monti has recently stated that he had devoted his
efforts to making “independent and neutral assessments” and that EC competition policy has become “clearly grounded in sound micro-economics.”38 I have
no doubt that EC policy is moving in the correct direction of requiring sound
economic theory and cogent evidence to be adduced before intervention.

A. NEED TO DISCHARGE GREATER BURDEN OF PROOF
In Airtours,39 Tetra Laval,40 and Schneider,41 the CFI overturned Commission decisions prohibiting those three mergers.42 In the three instances, the Commission
was found not to have discharged its burden of proof for reaching a prohibition
decision. For example, in Airtours, the CFI condemned the Commission’s decision in the following terms:

“[T]he Court concludes that the Decision, far from basing its prospective
analysis on cogent evidence, is vitiated by a series of errors of assessment as
to factors fundamental to any assessment of whether a collective dominant
position might be created. It follows that the Commission prohibited the
transaction without having proved to the requisite legal standard that the
37 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
38 Monti, A Reformed Competition Policy, supra note 21.
39 Airtours, supra note 1.
40 Tetra Laval, supra note 1.
41 Schneider, supra note 1.
42 In an interesting postscript to these cases, both Airtours and Schneider have filed actions for damages against the Commission.
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concentration would give rise to a collective dominant position of the three
major tour operators, of such a kind as significantly to impede effective competition in the relevant market.”43

B. RESPONSES TO THIS CRITICISM
As acknowledged by Commissioner Monti in a recent speech, this “rigorous
scrutiny” is “a welcome development, but also a challenging one.”44
Commissioner Monti has acted quite positively to this high profile criticism. The
Commission has appointed a Chief Economist, Lars-Hendrik Röller, and has
hired a team of industrial economists with the task of providing an independent
and objective opinion on a case’s economic merits. This appointment should
lead to greater economic analysis when deciding which cases to bring and which
mergers to prohibit; the Commission should not be concerned about bringing
winnable cases under current law but should seek only to bring cases that have a
sound economic basis.45
In addition, at an organizational level, Commissioner Monti has disbanded the
Merger Task Force, which used to have exclusive competence in the review of
mergers, and has replaced it with teams aligned according to different industry sectors. The Commission has also initiated a devil’s advocate/peer review system
under which cases which are examined under phase II of the Merger Regulation46
are subjected to scrutiny by an independent team of Commission officials. These
reforms should further help strengthen the Commission’s decision-making process.
It is often noted that in merger cases the Commission acts as investigator, judge,
and prosecutor. Unlike in the United States where the DOJ must obtain an injunction to prevent a merger, Commission decisions are not, in the normal course of
events, subject to judicial review. The knowledge that facts will have to stand up
to judicial scrutiny and that witnesses will have to survive the cauldron of crossexamination acts as a disciplining tool on DOJ officials. The Commission’s decision-making, on the other hand, requires essentially only self-discipline. Given the
length of proceedings—even in Tetra Laval where a new expedited procedure was
used, the CFI’s judgment was handed down a year after the Commission’s prohibi-

43 Airtours, supra note 1, at para. 294.
44 Monti, A Reformed Competition Policy, supra note 21.
45 For an interesting reflection on the role and impact of a U.S. Special Economic Assistant, see Oliver E.
Williamson, From Theory to Practice: Working with Economic Experts, 17-SPG Antitrust 61.
46 Council Regulation 139/2004/EC on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L
24) 1, replacing Council Regulation 4064/89/EEC.
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tion decision—and that subsequent actions for damages are no real compensation
for a wronged company, this lack of an independent check on the Commission is
a major difficulty. The internal nature of the peer review system may well not prove
adequate in this respect. It certainly does not, for example, go as far as the United
Kingdom’s House of Lords Select Committee would have wished when it suggested having a new case team for phase II of all mergers.47
There have, however, been signs that these reforms may be producing positive
results. In 2004, the Commission cleared the creation of the joint venture merging the recorded music businesses of Sony and Bertelsmann after consideration
of detailed pricing evidence.48 After in depth analysis of bidding data during its
phase II investigation, the Commission has very recently also cleared the way for
Oracle to acquire Peoplesoft.49 Both cases are good examples of the Commission’s
renewed commitment to base its merger decisions on solid economic thinking,
and it is hoped that this trend will be continued in the future.

C. NEED FOR MORE EFFECTS-BASED DOCTRINES
Fact-intensive investigation is the key to good antitrust enforcement. Economic
theory cannot be used if it is unburdened by careful factual analysis. For example, product bundling is usually pro-consumer but can under certain circumstances be anticompetitive, and, without due attention to the facts, it is often
impossible to tell which is the case.
In some instances, the EC authorities have not had to carry out this detailed
factual analysis. For example, in both BA/Virgin and Michelin II, the CFI stated
that there was no need to show that the rebate schemes under consideration had
anticompetitive effects on the market. It was sufficient to prove that they “tended to have” or “were capable of having” this effect.50 This failure of the CFI to
demand proof of anticompetitive effects, or at the very least, require that the
conduct be likely to have such effects is disappointing from a court that in the
area of mergers has been so willing to grapple with economics and complex
facts.51 In contrast, the Microsoft decision is more satisfactory, as the Commission

47 The Review of the EC Merger Regulation, 32nd Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Union, HL Paper 165, Session 2001-02, at para. 255, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldselect/ldeucom/165/16501.htm.
48 Sony/BMG, supra note 2.
49 Oracle/PeopleSoft, supra note 3.
50 BA/Virgin, supra note 34, at para. 293.
51 As noted by a Senior Commission official, “We [...] were slightly surprised at the Court of First
Instance’s analysis in Michelin II, that it placed so great an emphasis on per se rules and on certain
types of conduct and did not go into any further economic analysis of the case.” (Lowe, supra note 22.)
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took due account of possible efficiencies and of the concrete effects of certain
practices on the market.
Allegedly exclusionary conduct is a subject of complexity and controversy and
the CFI, in the rebates cases, appears to have simply set the Commission’s bar too
low by not requiring more than a demonstration that conduct tends to have a
certain effect. It can only be hoped that the Commission itself addresses this
point in its forthcoming guidelines on the application of Article 82.

D. RECOGNITION OF THE ROLE OF EFFICIENCIES
On a more positive note, the Commission’s recent guidelines on horizontal
mergers at last give due recognition to the role of efficiencies in antitrust analysis.52 The guidelines state that efficiencies may counteract potential harm to customers brought about by a merger, and that the Commission will make an “overall competitive appraisal of the merger.”53 It will take “any substantiated efficiency claim” into consideration, provided that it is of benefit to consumers, mergerspecific, and verifiable.54
This is a very promising development and contrasts vividly with the inadequate treatment of efficiencies in GE/Honeywell. There, the Commission objected to the increased access to capital that Honeywell would enjoy due for instance
to GE’s AAA bond rating. Cheaper access to capital is a source of efficiency like
all other efficiencies so it should, like any other efficiency, be a reason to approve
a merger, not prohibit it. Further, the Commission’s conclusion was reached
despite the fact that Honeywell’s main competitors (United Technologies, BF
Goodrich, and Thales) were large financially healthy companies and that GE’s
competitors (Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney) were both investing heavily in
the development of their next generation engines.
The United States has long regarded analysis of efficiencies as integral to
antitrust enforcement. The rule of reason requires a balancing of the pro- and
anticompetitive effects of conduct. In addition, in the United States, account is
taken of both allocative efficiencies (i.e. those realized through cutting price,
increasing output, and moving towards a more competitive outcome) and productive efficiencies (i.e. actual reductions in unit costs due to cost
savings/economies of scale). It is not clear that the Commission takes allocative
efficiencies into account in the same manner. In GE/Honeywell the Commission
maintained that the parties had not claimed any merger-specific cost savings;
rather the price cuts that would have flowed from mixed bundling were not true
52 Commission Notice on Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5.
53 Id. at para. 76.
54 Id. at paras. 77-78.
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efficiencies but strategic pricing that would not result in sustainable price reductions.55 There is no sound economic basis for this differing treatment of allocative and productive efficiencies, but it is hoped that the Commission will now
truly take account of “any substantiated efficiency claim” (emphasis added).

E. OTHER REFORMS

SOME

Outside the area of mergers, the Commission has inspired
legislation and guidance that is infused with greater economic thinking: its block exemption for vertical
restraints;56 its guidelines on vertical57 and horizontal58
agreements; its revised block exemption59 and accompanying guidelines60 on the transfer of technology; and the
notices prepared for the coming into force of decentralized application of Article 81.

P R A C T I C E S A R E N O T A LWAY S

OF THE

COMMISSION’S

INSPIRED BY MODERN ECONOMIC
T H I N K I N G B U T R AT H E R B Y
NOTIONS OF PROTECTING THE
PROCESS OF COMPETITION.

IT

I S E X P E C T E D T H AT T H E

COMMISSION

WILL PRODUCE

GUIDELINES IN THIS AREA IN
Article 82, recently described as the “last of the steam
powered trains,”61 has however, been slightly neglected to
THE NEAR FUTURE, AND IT IS
date, as it alone has not been reformed during
H O P E D T H AT T H E S E W I L L U S H E R
Commissioner Monti’s tenure. Some of the Commission’s
IN MUCH-NEEDED, MORE
practices, for example on rebates, are not always inspired
E C O N O M I C A L LY- I N S P I R E D , R E F O R M .
by modern economic thinking but rather by notions of
protecting the process of competition. As stated, it is
expected that the Commission will produce guidelines in this area in the near
future, and it is hoped that these will usher in much-needed, more economically-inspired, reform.

55 Götz Drauz, Unbundling GE/Honeywell: the Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers Under EC
Competition Law, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York (Oct. 2001), at 25-28.
56 Commission Regulation 2790/99/EC on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of
Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21.
57 Commission Notice on Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 1.
58 Commission Notice on Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal
Cooperation Agreements, 2001 O.J. (C 3) 2.
59 Commission Regulation 772/2004/EC on the Application of Article 81(3) to Categories of Technology
Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11.
60 Commission Notice on Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology
Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 2.
61 Brian Sher, The Last of the Steam-Powered Trains: Modernising Article 82, E.C.L.R. 2004, 25(5), 244.
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V. Fourth, Realize That Our Predictive
Capabilities Are Limited
A. THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH
Antitrust officials should, like doctors, take a sort of Hippocratic oath: before
intervening, they should be confident that their actions will not cause harm.
Antitrust authorities should not seek to be industrial policymakers, but they
should limit themselves to being diligent law enforcers. This is because the predictive powers of antitrust lawyers are limited. Markets evolve in ways that even
sophisticated industry participants could not have anticipated.
Sadly, although practice is improving, not all examples of enforcement under
Commissioner Monti have shown such restraint. First, Tetra Laval62 is a disappointment, both in the overly speculative approach taken by the Commission
in its administrative ruling and, as demonstrated by the appeal to the ECJ, the
degree to which the Commission has resisted the CFI’s efforts to hold it to a
reasonable standard of proof. Government should embrace such judicially
imposed burdens and not seek to exercise its enormous powers without first
demonstrating some degree of likelihood that those powers are required to
address specific anticompetitive effects. Second, in GE/Honeywell the
Commission reached conclusions on the forced exit of competitors without
adequate account being taken of the possible counterstrategies available to
these competitors (teaming arrangements and mergers amongst themselves). It
thus failed to give due regard to Nash’s test of equilibrium which assumes that
every other market player will play his best strategy. Further, any determination, based on a possible ultimate outcome, should be reached only where the
authority is very confident that rivals will be forced from the market. Mere
reliance on their word is not sufficient.

B. NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND FORWARD THINKING
Linked to this recognition of limited ability to predict, antitrust authorities
should be flexible and forward-looking. Often antitrust authorities are called
upon to intervene in new economy industries and it must be ensured that they
adapt to changes in these industries. In this context, it is important to recognize
the role of non-price competition in dynamic industries. For example, new-economy industries frequently require risky upfront investments that will not be made
without the promise of substantial return. The costs of regulatory mistakes are
therefore very high as government interference may frustrate innovation and discourage efficient practices, and this to the detriment of the competition touchstone itself, consumer welfare. In new-economy industries, it may thus be better
to err on the side of reducing Type I (falsely finding abuse) errors over reducing

62 Tetra Laval/Sidel, supra note 27.
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Type II errors (falsely not finding abuse). Yet, of course, a balance must be struck;
some regulation is necessary—and prices cannot be allowed to rise to unacceptably high levels. Additionally, the emergence of potentially superior new
entrants should be encouraged.
The Commission has been somewhat responsive to the need for competition
policy to be cognizant of effects on ex ante incentives for investment and innovation. For example, the recently adopted guidelines on technology transfer
agreements contain several statements about competition being dynamic and the
importance of incentives for innovation.63 The new block exemption contains
fewer per se prohibitions on certain types of clauses and gives parties greater flexibility in drafting agreements. Also, the guidelines confirm that above the block
exemption’s safe harbor market share thresholds, there is no presumption that
intellectual property and license agreements, as such, give rise to antitrust concerns. Finally, the Commission states at the outset of the guidelines that it will
be reasonable and flexible in applying the block exemption and it rules out a
mechanical application thereof.64

VI. Fifth, Impose No Unnecessary Bureaucratic
Roadblocks
Regulatory authorities must work hard to ensure that antitrust laws do not themselves become bureaucratic roadblocks to efficient transactions. The vast majority of agreements and transactions that are entered into on a daily basis are procompetitive or, at worst, competitively neutral. This is equally true in relation to
mergers. The views of ECJ Advocate General Antonio Tizzano in his recent
Tetra Laval opinion are particularly illustrative of this; he notes that “[in cases of
uncertainty] it has been thought preferable to run the risk of authorizing a transaction incompatible with the common market, rather than the risk of prohibiting one that is compatible, so unjustifiably restraining the parties’ freedom of
economic activity.”65
The need for efficient review applies not only to administrative authorities,
but also to the judiciary. Unfortunately, as discussed above, the EC regime—at
least in relation to merger review—is still far away from the U.S. prosecutorialstyle model, where it is up to the judge and not the enforcer to decide whether a
merger should be prohibited or not. I strongly believe that a clear separation of
the functions of prosecutor and jury is critical for efficient antitrust enforcement,

63 See, e.g., Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer
Agreements, supra note 60, at para. 70.
64 Id. at para. 3.
65 Case C-12/03, Commission v. Tetra Laval, ECJ judgment pending, at para. 79.

172

Hosted byCompetition
The Berkeley
Press
International
PolicyElectronic

Mario Monti’s Legacy: A U.S. Perspective

and that in the long-term such separation of powers can only bring benefits to
the enforcer who must convincingly argue the merits of its case in front of an
independent third party. While it is now clear that there will be no changes in
the short term to the way mergers are reviewed in Europe, it is fair to note that
Commissioner Monti was open to discuss the issue throughout the merger reform
process.66 Throughout his tenure, Commissioner Monti has also provided unconditional support for the work of the judiciary, even if the Commission’s challenge
to the standard of review set by the CFI in Tetra Laval poses some doubt as to
how the Commission sees its role in the merger review process.
On the plus side, the successful implementation of the administrative reforms
undertaken in the antitrust field is one of Commissioner Monti’s key successes.
As I noted in one of my speeches while I was at the DOJ,67 a regulatory authority should strive to further four main goals: (i) to eliminate unnecessary and costly existing regulation; (ii) to inhibit the growth of unnecessary new regulation;
(iii) to minimize the competitive distortions caused where regulation is necessary
by advocating the least anticompetitive form of regulation consistent with the
valid regulatory objectives; and (iv) to ensure that regulation is properly
designed to accomplish legitimate regulatory objectives. There is no doubt that
the Modernization Regulation is driven by such objectives. The Modernization
Regulation is based on the principles of efficient supervision—with the allocation of resources to those areas of antitrust law where intervention is most important—and simplified administration. It is a radical shift from earlier EC decisionmaking, and introduces a principle of self-assessment where it will be up to the
companies—and their legal and economic advisers—to undertake an overall
assessment of the potential pro- and anticompetitive effects of their agreements.
The Modernization Regulation thus puts an end to the 40-year-old system of
notification to the Commission of agreements that may prima facie be restrictive
of competition but may also qualify for exemption. While the notification system provided for some degree of legal certainty (that said, the comfort letters
which the Commission used in the majority of cases, were not binding in national proceedings), it placed severe burdens on the Commission’s enforcement
activities and only very rarely led to prohibition decisions by the Commission.68

66 See, e.g., Mario Monti, Review of the EC Merger Regulation—Roadmap for the Reform Project, British
Chamber of Commerce Conference on Reform of European Merger Control, Brussels (Jun. 4, 2002),
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/252&
format=HTML.
67 William J. Kolasky, A Culture of Competition for North America, Economic Competition Day: Shared
Experiences at the Federal Competition Commission of Mexico, Mexico City (Jun. 24, 2002), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11351.htm.
68 According to the Commission’s White Paper on Modernization of the Rules Implementing Articles [85]
and [86] of the EC Treaty, supra note 15, at 29, under the earlier regime there were only nine decisions
in which a notified agreement was prohibited without a complaint having been lodged against it.
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The Commission’s efforts in clarifying its understanding of Articles 81 and 82 by
means of notices should hopefully bring further reassurance to the business community about the type of conduct which is likely to be
T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S E F F O RT S I N
tolerated by the Commission and the Member States’
antitrust authorities.
C L A R I F Y I N G I T S U N D E R S TA N D I N G
O F A RT I C L E S 81 A N D 82 B Y
However, it is possible that the principles inspiring the
MEANS OF NOTICES SHOULD
review of the antitrust procedural rules have not been
extended to the merger field. The EC merger review
H O P E F U L LY B R I N G F U RT H E R
process has been described as “front-loaded,” because the
REASSURANCE TO THE BUSINESS
parties’ initial Form CO notification must set forth in
COMMUNITY ABOUT THE TYPE
great detail the transaction, the conditions in the affectOF CONDUCT WHICH IS
ed markets, and the impact the transaction has on those
markets. In exchange for this intensive provision of data,
L I K E LY T O B E T O L E R AT E D .
the merging parties are afforded the (relatively) short
deadlines for clearance by the Commission in cases that raise few anticompetitive concerns. Past Commission practice shows that, during the period 19902004, more than 90 percent of the merger cases notified to the Commission
have been cleared during a phase I (non-extended) procedure. Against this
background, which confirms that the vast majority of mergers are either procompetitive or competitively neutral, the new Form CO requires provision of
even more extensive data, in particular by introducing additional disclosure
requirements for closely related neighboring markets to those in which the parties to the concentration are active.69 The same requirements apply in relation
to the referral possibilities that the new EC merger legislation affords to merging parties, by means of a “reasoned submission,” as provided for in Form RS.70
However, Form RS requires, among other items, detailed explanations on market definition; specific information on the parties’ and their competitors’ market shares; in addition to detailed customer and supplier data in all potentially
affected Member States. The amount of information required by Form RS may
act as a barrier for making extended use of the opportunities that the referral
system affords to merging parties.

69 Product markets are closely related neighboring markets when the products are complementary to
each other or when they belong to a range of products that is generally purchased by the same set of
customers for the same end use, see Form CO relating to the Notification of a Concentration Pursuant
to Regulation 139/2004/EC, supra note 46.
70 Form RS relating to Reasoned Submissions Pursuant to Articles 4(4) and 4(5) of Regulation
139/2004/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 133) 31.
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VII. Sixth, Promote a Better Understanding of
Sound Competition Policy, Including
International Initiatives
The principles set out above provide strong examples of the impact that antitrust
enforcers may have in advancing consumer welfare through engaging in forceful
competition advocacy. The influence of a competition authority can also be
measured by the extent to which the agency has made a real contribution to furthering antitrust policies in the international context, be it through bilateral
exchanges or by building strong partnerships in the international fora.

A. BILATERAL COOPERATION
Despite the diverging positions of the EC and U.S. authorities in such prominent
cases as GE/Honeywell and Microsoft, there is no doubt that Commissioner Monti
has made a very substantial contribution to a better understanding of EC
antitrust policy in the international arena. In fact, in the wake of the
Commission’s prohibition of the GE/Honeywell merger, Commissioner Monti
embarked on a personal crusade—with the full support of antitrust officials on
the other side of the Atlantic—to bridge any gaps that the GE/Honeywell decision may have brought to light. The decision is a good reminder that without
extensive bilateral cooperation, the sharing of fundamentally similar goals may
still prove insufficient to bring about convergent results. The openness of the
Commission to discuss its decision should be praised, as it triggered an important
debate on the economic issues surrounding the topic of portfolio effects and
related theories of harm.71 It also led to encouraging statements from
Commissioner Monti about the positive approach of the Commission to efficiency-enhancing mergers and to later recognition of the importance of efficiencies
in the new horizontal merger guidelines.
As noted earlier, EC-U.S. cooperation has not been restricted to the merger
field, and during Commissioner Monti’s tenure both antitrust authorities have
regularly exchanged views and have successfully assisted each other in the prosecution of some of the most prominent international cartels (e.g. Vitamins and
Fine Arts Auction cartels). The Commission has also concluded bilateral agreements with other key antitrust authorities, such as those in Canada and in particular Japan, with whom the European Communities successfully entered a
cooperation agreement during Commissioner Monti’s tenure (July 2003).72

71 See, e.g., OECD Roundtable on Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers, supra note 24.
72 See European Commission, Agreement Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities (Jul. 10,
2003). Note that the EC also entered a Memorandum of Understanding with the Republic of Korea on
the terms for a bilateral competition dialogue on Oct. 28, 2004.
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B. REGIONAL (EU) COOPERATION
The Commission’s increased efforts towards multilateral cooperation find their
strongest expression at regional (EU) level. The Modernization Regulation relies
on a network of competition authorities, the ECN, which should provide a basis
for increased cooperation by the Commission and national competition authorities in the application of Articles 81 and 82. In the context of the reform process
that led to the Modernization Regulation, the Commission surrendered its
monopoly on the application of the Article 81(3) exception to the prohibition
of agreements, which prima facie restrict competition for the benefit of Member
State competition authorities and courts. The ECN largely mirrors the cooperation that the new EC Merger Regulation envisages for the Commission and
national competition authorities, most notably through an increased use of the
referral mechanisms provided for under EC law, which ensure that merger cases
are allocated to the authorities that are best placed to deal with them.73

C. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION
At multilateral level, Commissioner Monti has been one of the strongest proponents of the work undertaken by the International Competition Network (ICN).
The ICN is a network of national competition authorities that now comprises
more than 80 members and has been instrumental in facilitating a better understanding of competition law enforcement. It has recently extended its work from
the areas of competition advocacy and merger activity (where the ICN has had
a very visible role) to examination of the fundamental issues surrounding anticartel enforcement. As an example of the positive cross-contamination effects
that multilateral fora like the ICN may have on national authorities, the
Commission played close attention to the set of (non-binding) Guiding
Principles and Recommended Practices that the ICN adopted for the control of
multi-jurisdictional mergers. In the context of the review of the EC Merger
Regulation, some of ICN’s recommendations, in particular those pertaining to a
more flexible approach to the triggering factors and the timing for notifying a
concentration, were incorporated—as advocated by the Commission—into the
new rules.74
In addition to the role played within the ICN and in other multinational agencies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development or
the UN Conference on Trade and Development, few will question
Commissioner Monti’s efforts to develop a better understanding of the competition rules through capacity building programs, which are indispensable to further
the independence and credibility of the younger competition authorities. In this

73 See, e.g., Council Regulation 139/2004/EC, supra note 46, at art. 9, 22.
74 See id. at art. 4(1).
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international context, it is also worth recalling that Commissioner Monti was
one of the strongest proponents of incorporating a set of multilateral rules on
competition within the framework of the World Trade Organization trade agreements.75 Even if it is now clear that—at least for the time being—the ongoing
trade round will not deal with this issue,76 the debate initiated by the
Commission is yet another example of the importance that Commissioner Monti
has afforded to international initiatives throughout his tenure. ▼

75

“In the absence of a specialized world-wide competition organization and in view of the complementary relationship between trade and competition policy, the World Trade Organization is the
institution best suited to house an International Competition Agreement. The WTO possesses the
advantages of a very broad membership and a tradition of enforcing binding rules. That is why the
Commission has been at the forefront of efforts to persuade member countries on the merits of a
WTO multilateral agreement in the area of competition.” (Mario Monti, A Global Competition Policy,
European Competition Day, Copenhagen (Sep. 17, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/399&format=HTML.)

76

See WTO General Council Decision adopted on Aug. 1, 2004, WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004).
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